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CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
According to the OECD, foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) is the development of a lasting
interest by a resident enterprise in one country
through direct investment in another enterprise
in another country. FDI is seen as a long-
term relationship between the investor and
the enterprise with significant influence on the
management of the enterprise.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
distinguishes between FDI and foreign port-
folio investment. Direct investment is viewed
as a method of securing influence on over-
seas operation and tends to be associated with
a lasting commercial relationship. Investors
would provide other resources such as knowl-
edge, management techniques, technology, and
marketing strategy. Portfolio investors, on the
other hand, have less influence and control over
the decision-making processes within an enter-
prise with potentially important implications for
future business processes and monetary flows
(International Monetary Fund, 2010).
These definitions arise from the perspective
that countries have a strategic interest in keeping
accounting records of all monetary transactions
between each other bilaterally and between them
and the rest of the world.
The estimated global flow of FDI for 2012
is 1.4 US$ trillion. The economic crisis trig-
gered a slowdown in FDI in 2009 and 2010
(Figure 1). However, investment in 2011 rose to
1.5 US$ trillion, equivalent to 2.5% increase on
the precrisis average. In the first two quarters
of 2012, transition and developing countries
attracted over 50% of global FDI for the first
time (Figure 2). China remained the largest
recipient country in the same period, followed
by the United States.
The theoretical issues involved in the study of
FDI today are the same ones that are encoun-
tered in the study of transnational capital.
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) or transna-
tional corporations (TNCs) are the main drivers
of FDI flows. Dunning and Lundan (2008)
treat the two terms as practically synonymous.
The awareness of the importance of transna-
tional capital is reflected in the United Nation’s
establishment of the Program on TNCs, which
evolved into the division on investment, tech-
nology, and enterprise development at the
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).
FDI THEORY DEVELOPMENT
FDI is a strategic option for firms that undertake
it and for the states that seek to attract and regu-
late it. Lagging behind the practice of FDI is the
belated development of a theoretical framework
that satisfactorily integrates economic structure
and agency. Managerial players are free to make
and implement strategic choices, albeit within
the limits of their structural circumstances. The
extent to which these players perceive these
circumstances and are capable of analyzing them
can be uneven and incomplete. The lateness of
this development is mainly due to a paradigmatic
indifference to FDI.
Although a critical reading of classical studies
opens conceptual spaces for a discussion of
FDI as a strategic option, international factor
mobility is redundant in standard neoclassical
international trade theories with no trade costs.
Within the neoclassical paradigm, factor price
equalization does not stimulate international
factor mobility.
Indeed, trade and factor mobility substitute
each other in Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson
trade models. Between two states of equi-
librium, factor price equalization should be
restored as effectively by either trade or factor
mobility interchangeably. The weakness of these
models became evident when it was observed
that FDI and international trade do grow
together, although at different rates, with FDI
growing faster than trade in certain periods. In
the early 1990s, FDI worldwide was growing
at a faster rate than world production, capital
formation, and trade. In 2011, although FDI
was slower in recovering from the crisis than
global industrial output and trade, UNCTAD
expected it to reach its precrisis peak in 2013
(UNCTAD et al., 2011).
It is such observations that encourage the
development of new theoretical perspectives to
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Figure 1 Foreign direct investment global flows. Source: UNCTAD.
99.9
57.4
34.7 30.8 29.7 27.4 24.5 23.5 21.4
China United
States
France United
States
Brazil Singapore Canada Australia Belgium
B
ill
io
ns
 o
f U
S
 D
ol
la
rs Jan–Jun 2011 Jan–Jun 2012
Figure 2 Foreign direct investment inflows – top 10 host countries. Source: UNCTAD.
account for FDI. Indeed, the practice of FDI
in the last quarter of the twentieth century has
been growing rapidly. While world FDI inflows
stood at $US 57 billion in 1982, they rose to
$US 201 billion in 1990, $US 1969 billion in
2007, and $US 1122 billion in 2010.
Trapped in the neoclassical paradigm of inter-
national trade and financial investment theory,
mainstream academic scholarship came late to
the recognition of the strategic character of FDI.
Three groundbreaking intellectual perspectives
spurred by Coase, Hymer, and Penrose provided
the initial tremors causing the paradigm to begin
to shift. In classic Kuhnian manner, however, the
institutionalized paradigm continues to defend
itself.
The first event is Coase’s bid to construct a
theory based on the concept of transaction costs
and to predict whether a given economic task
would be performed within or without the firm
on the market. From the traditional assumption
of the efficiency of markets it follows that, all
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things being equal, contracting out is always
cheaper than employing labor to perform a given
task. The firm emerges when the transaction
costs of procuring a good or service is higher
than that produced directly without recourse to
the market. The limit to this strategy is deter-
mined by decreasing returns to the entrepreneur
function such as the cost of management’s
resource allocation errors. The ratio of internal
to external contractual relations (between the
firm and the suppliers of outsourced inputs), an
index of the firm’s size, is the result of the calcu-
lation of the most economic balance between the
two under given conditions (Coase, 1937).
The next big leap forward comes with the
approach of Hymer (1960). Distinguishing
between portfolio investment and direct invest-
ment, Hymer sought to explain foreign direct
investment as the strategy of firms seeking to
achieve one or more of the following:
• Retain control of production with a view to
realize economic rents
• Eliminate competition
• Access technology
• Access capital markets.
Hymer’s relatively new economic perspective
consisted in identifying the MNE as the mech-
anism for international production, rather than
international trade. He articulated FDI as the
extension of industrial organization (IO) theory
to the international level. Hymer’s approach
introduced an understanding of why the inter-
national corporations move around products,
business know-how, and technology among its
units across different countries, keeping control
and rights over its international assets. Hymer’s
perspective is framed by the political economy of
underdevelopment Hymer (1968). When he was
developing his critique of the MNE as an insti-
tution, FDI was perceived in some developing
countries as a form of neocolonialism. The
perspective today has changed as governments
everywhere compete to attract FDI. Policies
promoting the ELIFFIT model (export-led
industrialization fueled by foreign investment
and technology) have become the norm rather
than the exception (Sklair, 1994).
A third seminal voice is that of Penrose (1959,
1987). In Hymer’s perspective, an extension
of Coase’s transaction cost approach, FDI (a
subset of “foreign operations”) requires a firm
to “internalize” an operation in another country.
This explains why in certain circumstances a
firm opts for FDI rather than, say, licensing
the production of its goods in another country.
Penrose’s concept of intrafirm knowledge gener-
ation makes it easier to understand why a firm
chooses to “make or buy.”
Until a theory of the transnational enterprise
and FDI emerges that is capable of bridging the
epistemological gap that separates its territory
from that of international strategic manage-
ment (ISM), Dunning’s OLI framework will be
taken to be the extant theory of transnational
enterprise. The framework involves:
• Ownership (advantages in terms of market
power arising from a firm’s ownership of a
good or asset than nobody else has)
• Location (advantages of producing in
another country rather than exporting to it
and/or the advantage of lower factor costs in
another country)
• Internalization (advantage of FDI over
outsourcing from abroad)
The general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE)
model solves a theoretical problem, namely that
decreasing trade costs (say, as happens in the
case of increasing economic integration, such
as in the European Union) do not in fact result
in diminishing FDI, indeed the opposite can
and does happen through, for example, mergers
and acquisitions (Neary, 2008). This brings us
back to a point raised earlier on in this entry,
namely the fruitfulness of engaging with the
relationship between FDI and oligopoly (see,
e.g., Ferret, 2008). Although an assessment of
the contribution of game theory to the under-
standing of FDI and rent seeking TNCs goes
beyond the aim of this article, its impact on
teaching and research in this field is undeniable.
The corpus of literature on ISM evolved from
the field of IO. Very schematically expressed,
Bain’s seminal work on IO influenced the
development of the field of business policy,
which led to the development of ISM (Porter,
1981; Porter, 1990, see also Stonehouse and
Snowdon, 2007; interview of Porter with an
introduction, 2007), thus justifying Buckley’s
4 foreign direct investment
characterization of ISM as the “grandchild” of
IO (Buckley, 1996: 12).
The field of ISM, however, rejected what
it regarded as IO’s structural determinism,
on the grounds that the industrial structure,
conduct, and performance continuum practi-
cally squeezed strategy out of the causal chain,
thereby making it redundant and suggesting
that performance could be directly deduced
from structure.
From this follows ISM’s prioritization of the
performance of individual firms over macroeco-
nomic parameters. It is this agency orientation
of ISM, its concern to escape the causal straight-
jacket of structure of the tradition whence it
emerged, which leads ISM to posit the strategic
decision as the decisive causal moment of the
firm’s bid for competitive advantage over its
rivals.
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